Search results for "100 Philosophy"
showing 9 items of 9 documents
Communicative agency and ad hominem arguments in social epistemology : a commentary on Pierre Jacob
2015
The ongoing search for the neuronal correlate of consciousness
2015
The “bottom-up” approach to mental life : a commentary on Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling
2015
Can synchronization explain representational content? : A reply to Caspar M. Schwiedrzik
2015
A multiplicity view for social cognition : defending a coherent framework ; a reply to Lisa Quadt
2015
Enriching the notion of enculturation : cognitive integration, predictive processing, and the case of reading acquisition ; a commentary on Richard M…
2015
The cybernetic Bayesian brain: from interoceptive inference to sensorimotor contingencies
2015
Is there a single principle by which neural operations can account for perception, cognition, action, and even consciousness? A strong candidate is now taking shape in the form of “predictive processing”. On this theory, brains engage in predictive inference on the causes of sensory inputs by continuous minimization of prediction errors or informational “free energy”. Predictive processing can account, supposedly, not only for perception, but also for action and for the essential contribution of the body and environment in structuring sensorimotor interactions. In this paper I draw together some recent developments within predictive processing that involve predictive modelling of internal p…
La funzione dell'immaginazione tra Kant e Fichte
2015
Il lavoro intende analizzare le dinamiche teoretiche che hanno visto l'immaginazione (nel senso tecnico di "Einbildungskraft") svolgere un ruolo nevralgico nell'impianto gnoseologico europeo prima in Kant e poi in Fichte contribuendo in primo piano al delicato passaggio filosofico dal criticismo all'idealismo tedesco
The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy
2013
This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess …